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In preparation for this conference I thought I'd read again C Wright Mills' The Sociological 
Imagination. Clearly there's a lot in that book about the pitfalls that sociologists face as they 
bounce about between the fetishisation of the concept on the one hand, and methodological 
inhibition and pretension on the other. There's much discussion, for example, of the 
'unreality' of 'grand theory' which 'neither enlarge[s] our understanding nor make[s] our 
experience more sensible'; and of the inadequacies of 'scientific method', which Mills argues 
yields a precision that is neither necessarily empirical nor true. And even if the product of 
abstracted empiricism were true, it may yet be unimportant. For Mills, the really substantive 
issue that concerns sociology is not only the difficulty of shuttling between levels of 
abstractions - 'we must also', he writes, 'speak of problems'.   
 
The sociological problem is the bridge between history and biography, and it's in the 
formulation of the problem that the sociological imagination realises its full potential. It's 
notable that for Mills, this imagination is as likely to be possessed by 'literary men and 
historians' as it is by 'professional' sociologists. Indeed The Sociological Imagination is in 
large part concerned with the problem of professionalisation; with how abstracted empiricism 
serves commerce and bureaucracy and grand theory serves nothing much at all. It's not 
surprising, therefore, that the appendix, 'On Intellectual Craftmanship', should read like an 
essay on the practice of creative writing. As for empirical work, Mills says that he tries to avoid 
it wherever he can. 
 
Nevertheless, sociological problems, while they might require the imagination to formulate, 
are not themselves imaginative fictions. On the contrary, an important sociological problem, 
Mills argues, must be genuinely relevant both to the sociological conception of historical 
social structure and to the detailed information that sociologists collect. While Mills argues 
that 'no one is "outside society,"' the sociologist is distinguished from 'the ordinary man' 
insofar as he or she is uniquely positioned to make visible - that is, make relevant - the 
relations between the daily experience that is here and now, and structures and forces 
(capitalism, power, patriarchy) which are not visible in themselves. Making the connections 
between these domains is the political task of the sociologist  / which Mills argues should be 
exercised in work, in educating, and in life.  
 The Sociologial Imagination, then, is as much about the experience of sociology - about the 
experience of being a sociologist, and about what experience understood in sociological terms 
makes possible for others - as it is about the complexity of the relations between theory, 
method, and data. In this paper I want to explore the character of that experience a little 
more, and to consider two challenges to it, which bring the relevance (or not) of sociological 
relevance into sharp relief. Its no accident, in view of the specialization of function that's said 
to characterize western modernity, that these challenges concern two 'modalities of 
experience', as Martin Jay describes them, that offer partial alternatives to epistemic 
experience: they are aesthetic and religious experiences.  
 
Jay shows how the fracturing of function and experience into discrete subcategories has 
'palpable benefits'. I won't list the subcategories or the benefits here; suffice to note that 
they're persuasive. Despite the benefits however, and with Mills, I want to suggest that 
modern 'expertise' might be specifically problematic for sociology in the light of its ambitions 
to be relevant. And in a departure from Mills, that the channeling of sociological experience 
also has its problems. The emphasis in this paper therefore, will lie more on sociology as a 
practice and an experience than on the complex theories that are deployed in sociology which 
seek to address experience and/or the fatal split between subject and object, facts and values, 
and so on. But I'll be using one such theory myself at the end, in order to slightly refigure the 
sociological problem and indeed the sociological experience.  
 
For the sake of brevity, I'll go directly - and speak rather schematically and reductively - of the 
'discursive turn' in sociology. Foucault's been especially influential here. As one commentator 
(Deleuze) summarises it: '[in] the conversion of phenomenology to epistemology …. 
Everything is knowledge, and this is the first reason why there's no "savage experience": 
there's nothing beneath or prior to knowledge'. This shift, from explaining daily experiences, 
as Mills puts it, to explaining the knowledges that produce experiences, has been extended - 
differently, to be sure - to other people's experiences of themselves as knowledge producers. 
'The sociology of scientific knowledge' would be the most obvious example here but, to be fair, 
sociology's own experience of knowledge production has also been the focus of considerable, 
self-reflexive, attention. There's an extensive literature in sociology which problematises both 
the kinds of knowledges that sociology seeks out and mobilises, as well as its methods and 
modes of knowing (and feminist theory has been important here). More recently still, there's 
been a focus on the productivity of knowledge- and other practices, and especially their 
material productivity (you could call this 'the ontological turn'). Crudely put, theory and 
methodology debates seem to have shifted from the sociological investigation into states of 
affairs, to the investigation of how states of affairs are understood (including in sociology), to 
the effects of sociological investigation in materially constituting states of affairs.  
 
From experience, to knowledge, and now perhaps to methods, practices, performativity, or, to 
give it a more philosophical slant, 'becoming'. Becoming is the 'how', as Alfred North 
Whitehead put it, that constitutes the empirical 'what' - in practical terms, the 'what' that's 
both invented through sociological concept and method and is also the object of sociological 
investigation.i This improves on the sociological critique of science, I think, since there's a 
vast difference between subordinating science to the categories of sociology (i.e. saying that 
science is a social undertaking like any other) and conferring on scientists the respect that the 
singularity of their endeavour deserves, that is, the invention of scientific objects under the 
strictest conditions. Ignoring the rather tricksy notion of 'invention', one might say that this is 
what experimental scientists have been doing all along: nature reveals its secrets only 'in 
bondage', said Bacon, 'not in freedom or in error, but "under constraint / and vexed"'.  What 
this conception of science requires of scientists, is that they remember this, and try not to 
generalise beyond science, or even beyond a particular experiment. So too, one might say (and 
we do say) should sociologists.  
 
But then again, despite the long and productive debate in the philosophy of social science on 
the relations between the social and natural sciences (a debate which often kicks off core 
sociological theory and methods courses) the sociological problem, at least as Mills describes 
it, is not a scientific problem, not least because it comes with explicitly political ambitions 
attached to it. Mills, I think, would argue that there's a great deal that sociology is obliged to 
be relevant to, other than its own inventions. This is the burden of responsibility that the 
empirical brings with it, in sociology.  
 
Being relevant is rather like the sociological equivalent of doing no harm in the Hippocratic 
oath: it’s an oath you take for others - Mills takes it for 'the ordinary man' - as much as for 
yourself. For whom one's research is for, however, is quite a tricky question, as the dualism in 
the history of British empirical sociology, between social research and sociological research, 
illustrates. Martin Bulmer suggests that the late institutionalisation of sociology in 
universities in Britain (the 1950s) accounts for the lack of continuity between social and 
sociological research, and also explains why, to quote, 'more empirical social research in 
Britain today is conducted in other disciplines and in non-academic research settings than by 
academic sociologists'. Being institutionalised however, is no guarantee that you can choose 
what you want to do, as many a grant application, submitted in the spirit of what might be 
called 'strategic empiricism', testifies. We might be seeing a lot more strategic empiricism 
given the recent reforms in higher education which leave sociology 'hanging in the balance' 
between those disciplines that, as some describe it, contribute directly to the valorisation of 
capital (like biotechnology, or the management of human resources) and those that appear 
not to (like the humanities).  
 
It's hard to find the referents for relevance in such a complicated landscape. Which brings me 
to my two examples, which are concerned less with the environment in which sociology 
operates, and more with sociology's own operations.  
 
So my first example concerns the diverse range of innovative methods and outputs that are 
being used and produced by sociologists today (strikingly different to those described, rather 
wearily, by Mills). I'm thinking of methods which utilise the visual and other senses for 
example, and outputs such as art works and exhibitions. In part, these initiatives can be 
situated in the context of changing sociological conceptions of the social world (that require 
different methods of sociological investigation), but they might also be understood in the 
context of, for example: funding body and commercial industry interest in interdisciplinary 
research; the rising numbers of practice-based PhDs in sociology; the integration of 'users' (or 
more recently, 'communities') into funded research; and, perhaps more broadly - and this 
might be an unexpected benefit to come out of the pressures on research funding - the move 
towards 'lateral connections across different forms of knowledge', as Foucault put it in his 
analysis of the specific intellectual.  
 
These developments raise - or should raise, if they're to be taken seriously - challenging 
implications for the sociological project as it's usually understood. For example: in what ways 
do they enable sociological problems to be articulated? What kind of knowing, if they are 
about knowing at all, do they give rise to? If the output of an interdisciplinary research project 
has an aesthetic dimension, to what extent does conceiving of such an output as a knowledge 
product/knowledge transfer betray that dimension and render it irrelevant? Does sociology 
have to refigure - to put it rather reductively - its 'epistemological becoming'? To be blunt: are 
the set texts on core sociology courses going to change?  
 
My second example concerns religion. I take my lead here from Saba Mahmood, who asks 
how it's possible for alliances to be forged between Muslim reformers in the Arab world and 
the U.S. State Department, given that these reformers aren't sympathetic to US foreign policy. 
And answers: a shared scriptural hermeneutics - in which the Qu'ranic text is understood as a 
privatised object of aesthetic, poetic and spiritual appreciation, 'its meaning open', to quote, 
'to infinite play but also to historical determination'. Mahmood explores how the privileging, 
if not 'naturalising', of this approach to the text serves to civilise and discipline religious 
subjectivity and to characterise the so-called 'traditional literalist' as an absurd and comic - an 
uneducated and unenlightened - figure. 
 
This textual hermeneutics requires, in short, what Mahmood calls a secular analytic 
standpoint, which is the standpoint we usually adopt, and expect our students to adopt, in the 
classroom. As recent experience at Goldsmiths testifies however, not all students - specifically, 
not all Muslim students - will submit to this. I'm not suggesting that sociology teachers share 
the same goals as the Whitehouse National Security Council's Muslim World Outreach 
programme, which aims to 'transform Islam from within'. Or that the relation between 
religion, education and the empirical is not, often, or even usually, deeply problematic (one 
need only consider creationism in this context, and/or the claim that the empirical is a 
betrayal of religious faith). It might be worth pausing, though, to ask to what extent the 
relation of sociology to religion, which is in effect a study of religion, displaces difficult 
questions about the relation between sociological pedagogic practice and religion. To what 
extent does clarity of epistemological approach necessarily translate into political clarity?  
 
These problems (for which I have no answers) are a reminder of what the training of 
professionals (and the training of experience) excludes, a point that Whitehead often 
underscored (of course, given his agendaii), in order to produce, to quote, 'both a restraint 
upon specialists and an enlargement of their imagination'. Restraint does seem on occasion to 
be appropriate: to at least acknowledge that there are other experiences to be had (other 
experiences of the text for example) that are perhaps not to be explained at all if that 
explanation serves only to explain them away. The problem with this is that while the 
sociological problem remains relevant, it is so only to things that are relevant to sociology.   
 
In conclusion, I'm going to have a stab at reorganising the co-ordinates to which sociological 
relevance refers, by referring to a 'domain', if it can be called that, which is not (oddly 
enough!) defined by Cartesian coordinates at all: the Deleuzian virtual. I am not proposing 
that sociology take on a Deleuzian 'world-view' (!); I simply want to put the concept to work, 
as in an experiment (a test or trial, as experience was originally understood to mean): an 
experiment in experience. I'm asking: what kind of experience would sociology be, and what 
experiences would it permit, if the problem were refracted through the virtual?  
 
So to recap: Mills' ontological commitments are to historical social structures on the one 
hand, and to some variation of the subject on the other. This much is already given; it's the 
connection that remains to be established. Making the connection successfully is 
transformative: it transforms the ordinary man's experience of his own experience. In the 
light of Mills' ontological a prioris however, one might speculate that this connection is 
actually important not because it illustrates the relevance of history to biography, but because 
the activity of connecting makes sociology relevant to its own problems. Relevance, in other 
words, is the evidence for what sociology already knows. Understood thus, the sociological 
problem is its own solution: it transforms ordinary experience into sociological experience. No 
wonder, then, to quote Mills again, that 'we (sociologists) must speak of problems'.  ! 
 
I'd like to refigure this, and suggest that the problem must speak (I don't actually like the 
speech metaphor, but I'm using it because Mills does). The minimum prior ontological 
commitments here are to the virtual and the actual / which in fact have some characteristics 
in common with the elements that compose the sociological problem. Minimally defined as a 
dimension of the actual that's neither observable nor accessible in itself, the virtual offers a 
'beyond'-actual-states-of-affairs for the social scientist to look to. I think that's important, 
because the explication of what isn't immediately, or indeed ever, accessible is how much of 
the 'magic' of sociology is generated (a magic that's arguably lost in the claim that sociology 
constitutes its own social worlds [without excess]). Unlike social structures however, virtual 
structures or patterns can't do 'explanatory work', because they're not determining in the way 
that social forces, or the material sedimentation of such forces over time, are often understood 
to be in sociology.iii The concept of the virtual, in other words, doesn't allow me to replace 
sociology as the articulator of problems, with sociology as the determining-agent of 
problems.iv 
 
Virtual structures are not determining not because the virtual has no relation to the actual 
(it's not an unintelligible outside), but because processes of actualisation introduce many 
contingent divergences. Indeed, if the relations between virtual and the actual were 
understood to be the ontological counterpart of the epistemological relations between the 
problem and the solution, then one might say that a virtual problem has many different 
solutions. These solutions can never be true though, because there is no true solution to a 
virtual problem; there's only the development of the problem in particular ways.  
 
There doesn't seem much here that will offer a referent for relevance, and yet I find this 
conception of the problem more robust than the sociological problem as Mills describes it, 
precisely because what's relevant or not is not decided in advance, but is rather held open 
until processes of actualisation are stabilised. Although the isomorphic relation between the 
virtual problem and the actual social researcher (and their approach) inevitably compromises 
the 'revelatory' capacity of discipline (which was so important to Mills), it does nevertheless 
confer on sociology an obligationv to 'rearticulate' the problem in novel ways. This may be an 
uncomfortable experience though, since rearticulating a virtual problem, unlike articulating a 
sociological problem, isn't in itself necessarily the agent of transformation or the mark of 
novelty. There's a difference between sophisticated observation and an event.vi It may be that 
sociology writes itself out of the problem because it can't secure its own relevance to it. The 
claim, for example, that 'our scientific grandfathers and fathers beat down religious doubts' 
(Mills' claim) may be relevant to sociology's experience of itself, but irrelevant to the 
experience of the student who remains silent, or who repeats like a mantra (but only until 
after their final exam), that all experiences are socially constructed.  
 
I'm not proposing relevance as a lure for the student-as-consumer, although it is relevant to 
the changing horizon of the Anglo-American university. Bill Readings describes the decline of 
the 'university of culture and reason' and the rise of the 'university of excellence', in which 
anything can be taught and anything can be researched as long as its taught and researched 
excellently. Although one might intuitively want to protect one's discipline from this 
intolerable situation by insisting that it is in fact the privileged site of a (particular kind of) 
experience (an experience of 'reason', for example), this arguably puts it into competition with 
all the other experiences that are available on the market (where sociology probably isn't 
going to fare very well!). Hence the significance not just of relevance, but of transformation. If 
the university is a place of learning, 'learning', in this revised version of the problem, cannot 
be about the sociologisation of experience, just as its not about the 'ordinary man' being 
'encouraged' to talk back.vii  It's not, in other words, about tolerating other people's 
experiences. On the contrary, when the problem [not the sociologist, and not the ordinary 
man] makes things that can't be identified in advance relevant to each other, both the 
'ordinary man' and the one who tries to articulate it are transformed. So if anything, I'd 
anticipate a fair bit of conflict.  
                                                      
i i.e. with the ontological turn, the privilege that once accrued to sociologists on the basis of 
the perceived rigour of their methods is now replaced with the constituting 'power' of 
sociological method. 
ii '[I]n the modern world the celibacy of the medieval learned class has been replaced by a 
celibacy of the intellect who is divorced from the concrete contemplation of the complete 
facts. Of course, no one is merely a mathematician, or merely a lawyer. People have lives 
outside their professions or their businesses. But the point is the restraint of serious thought 
within a groove' (facts and values.doc/hhs/publications). whitehead's talking about this, of 
course, in relation to abstractions and the relation of abstractions to experience etc. 
iii 'The reality of the virtual is structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations that 
form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing them from a reality 
which they have' (reality and virtual reality.doc/caspar/publications) 
iv a bit of a critique of law and urry's 'enacting the social then', which has no excess at all, but 
not of urry on complexity, where its all more finely tuned 
v an ethical obligation - ethics being the final upshot of deleuzian empiricism 
(event.doc/tcs/publications) 
vi so yes, there's always novelty in every reactualisation of the virtual, but we're talking the 
epistemological counterpart here, problems and solutions: . 'What is [most] frequently found', 
Deleuze writes, ' - and worse - are nonsensical sentences, remarks without interest or 
importance, banalities mistaken for profundities, ordinary "points" confused with singular 
points, badly posed or distorted problems - all heavy with dangers, yet the fate of us all'. 
vii i.e. its definitely not about a two-way 'dialogue', that the object would be able ('encouraged') 
to speak back to sociology (as in reflexive sociology): firstly because, as others have shown, 
this kind of 'ethics', or 'ethical' research, often serves only to tie the subject more closely into 
power relations (strathern on consent); secondly, because the object of investigation may not 
be a speaking subject (human speech may not be relevant); thirdly, because the subject is an 
effect of the problem; and finally, and most importantly, because the very notion of speaking 
to and speaking back, whether human or not, implies some autonomy of and distance 
between entities. 
 
